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Abstract
This paper develops a long run growth model for a major oil exporting economy and
derives conditions under which oil revenues are likely to have a lasting impact. This
approach contrasts with the standard literature on the "Dutch disease" and the "re-
source curse", which primarily focus on short run implications of a temporary resource
discovery. Under certain regularity conditions and assuming a Cobb Douglas produc-
tion function, it is shown that (log) oil exports enter the long run output equation with
a coe¢ cient equal to the share of capital. The long run theory is tested using a new
quarterly data set on the Iranain economy over the period 1979Q1-2006Q4. Building
an error correction specication in real output, real money balances, ination, real
exchange rate, oil exports, and foreign real output, the paper nds clear evidence for
two long run relations: an output equation as predicted by the theory and a standard
real money demand equation with ination acting as a proxy for the (missing) market
interest rate. Real output in the long run is shaped by oil exports through their impact
on capital accumulation, and the foreign output as the main channel of technological
transfer. The results also show a signicant negative long run association between
ination and real GDP, which is suggestive of economic ine¢ ciencies. Once the e¤ects
of oil exports are taken into account, the estimates support output growth convergence
between Iran and the rest of the world. We also nd that the Iranian economy adjusts
quite quickly to the shocks in foreign output and oil exports, which could be partly
due to the relatively underdeveloped nature of Irans nancial markets.
JEL Classications: C32, C53, E17, F43, F47, Q32.
Keywords: Growth models, long run relations, Iranian economy, oil price and
foreign output shocks, and error correcting relations.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we develop a long run output relation for a major oil exporting economy
where oil income to output ratio is expected to remain high over a prolonged period. This
approach contrasts with the Dutch diseaseand resource curse literature that considers
the revenues from the resource to be intrinsically temporary and focusses on the relatively
short term implications of the resource discovery. See Corden and Neary (1982), Krugman
(1987), Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986), and van der Ploeg and Venables (2009) for a
recent survey. We extend the stochastic growth model developed in Binder and Pesaran
(1999) to allow for the possibility that a certain fraction of oil export revenues is invested in
the domestic economy. We distinguish between the two cases where the growth of oil income,
g0, is less than the natural growth rate (the sum of the population growth, n, and the growth
of technical progress) and when g0  g + n. Under the former, the e¤ects of oil income on
the economys steady growth rate will vanish eventually, whilst under the latter, oil income
enters the long run output equation with a coe¢ cient which is equal to the share of capital
if it is further assumed that the underlying production technology can be represented as a
Cobb-Douglas production function.
The empirical validity of the long run output equation for the Iranian economy is exam-
ined by incorporating it into a vector autoregressive error correction model augmented with
foreign output. The resultant VARX* model is estimated using quarterly observations over
the period 1979Q1-2006Q4. The domestic variables included in the model are real GDP, the
rate of ination based on consumer price index (CPI), the o¢ cial and freemarket exchange
rates, and money and quasi money. Unlike most other macro models, ours does not include
the interest rate as an explicit variable because the domestic credit markets in Iran operate
under tight controls and the interest rate is not market-determined. But assuming that the
Fisher equation holds in the long run, the ination rate can be used as a proxy for the
interest rate. The foreign output variable is constructed as a weighted average of the log
output of Irans trading partners with the weights based on the relative size of their trade
with Iran (exports plus imports).
A number of models of Irans macroeconomy have been developed in the past. The
distinctive features of our model are: (1) a theory derived long run model for oil exporting
countries in which the long run role of oil export revenues for growth is explicitly modeled;
(2) a careful and parsimonious modeling of the ways in which major external variables
enter into the macroeconomic equations in Iran, taking into account the variety of channels
through which the variables inuence each other, including the implicit response of the
government to macroeconomic developments; (3) parameterization of the model to allow for
the measurement and testing of the macro-level impact of oil exports and global technological
progress on the Iranian economy; (4) joint modeling and estimation of output, ination,
money supply, and the real exchange rate, in contrast to models that focus on output or
ination alone, while treating the other variables as exogenous; and (5) use of quarterly data.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the VARX* model support the existence of two long
run relations, namely the real output and the real money demand equations, as predicted
by the theory. Furthermore, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that real output,
real money balances, real oil income, and foreign output are co-trending. The evidence also
supports the existence of a long run relation between domestic output, foreign output, and
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real oil exports, although we also nd that ination has a statistically signicant negative
e¤ect on real output. Once the e¤ects of oil exports are taken into account, the estimates
support output growth convergence between Iran and the rest of the world. These results
seem to be reasonably robust regardless of how foreign output is constructed, what measure
of the exchange rate is used, and whether a dummy variable for revolution and war (over
the period 1979Q1-1988Q2) is included in the model.
From the estimates, several conclusions can be drawn. One key result is the economys
fast adjustment to shocks, when compared to the response rates of other economies, especially
the developed ones. This seems to be due to the limitations of Irans nancial markets that
restrict expenditure smoothing options and thereby cause the economy to move up and down
quickly as external and internal conditions change. Second, we nd that although Iran may
lag behind its main trading partners in terms of technology levels, it has experienced a
similar rate of technological progress over the past three decades. Third, in the long run,
oil exports contribute to real income through real capital accumulation. As a result, the
elasticity of the aggregate real income with respect to real oil revenues (measured in term of
domestic output units) is equal to the marginal product of capital. We conrm this result
by showing that the nominal dollar value of oil revenues has the same impact on the real
GDP as would be caused by a decline in the dollar value of one unit of domestic output.
Fourth, our estimates suggest that in Iran, the output elasticity of capital (or the share of
capital) is about 0.26. This estimate is lower than the one often used in studies of Irans
economy. But, it seems quite reasonable given the large resource rents that can be channeled
towards investment. Fifth, there is a signicant negative association between ination and
real GDP. This implies that ination in Iran is largely driven by long-term adverse shocks to
the economy. Of course, to the extent that ination is driven exogenously by expansionary
macroeconomic policies, it could have major negative e¤ects on output. Sixth, in the long
run, the elasticity of real money balances with respect to the real output is around unity,
and ination (used as a proxy for interest rate) has a negative e¤ect on real money balances.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 develops a long run macroeconomic
model for an oil exporting economy and discusses the long run restrictions applicable to oil
exporters. Section 3 discusses the main macroeconomic trends in post-revolutionary Iran.
Section 4 describes the VARX* econometric model that embodies the long run relations.
Section 5 presents the long run estimates and the various tests of the long run theory.
Section 6 discusses the short run dynamics and provides evidence on speed of convergence
to equilibrium, impulse responses, and error correction estimates. Section 7 concludes.
A review of earlier work on macroeconomic models for Iran is provided in Appendix A.
This review is intended to place our modelling work in the context of the existing literature.
Data sources and computation of foreign output are described in Appendix B, and the results
of unit root tests are given in Appendix C.
2 A Theory of Economic Growth for a Major Oil Ex-
porter
Most papers in the growth literature do not include natural resource abundant economies, in
particular, oil exporting countries, in their cross-country empirical analysis. The literature
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that specically deals with resource abundant economies tends to focus on short term e¤ects,
and given the depletable nature of the resource, the revenues that ow from it are viewed as
"intrinsically temporary" (van der Ploeg and Venables (2009)). A number of early studies
also considered the macroeconomic e¤ects of the resource discovery and focussed on the
"Dutch disease" phenomenon rst experienced in Netherlands after the large, but short-
lived, discovery of gas in 1960s. See, for example, Corden and Neary (1982), Krugman
(1987), and Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986) among others.
Dutch disease postulates that an exogenous unexpected increase in foreign exchange
revenues from the resource, due to rising prices or output, will result in real exchange rate
appreciation and a fall in output and employment of the non-resource traded goods sector,
often manufacturing. This by itself need not have adverse long run implications for the
economy as a whole. One would expect the economy to re-adjust once the revenues from
the resource are diminished or vanish altogether, unless there are important non-convexities
or imperfections in the economy. For example, if the manufacturing sector is subject to
economies of scale or learning by doing, the loss of manufacturing capacity will be very
costly to reverse.
The more recent literature on resource abundance and economic growth focusses on the
political economy considerations and argues that large windfalls from the resource create
incentives for the rent-seeking activities that involve corruption (Mauro (1995) and Leite and
Weidmann (1999)), voracity (Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999)), and
possibly civil conicts (Collier and Hoe­ er (2004)).1 Some of these considerations have been
recently formalized by Caselli and Cunningham (2009) where they attempt to characterize
conditions under which an increase in the size of the resource rent leads to a decrease in
real output, the so called "natural resource curse" hypothesis. Empirical support for this
hypothesis was originally provided by Sachs andWarner (1995) who showed the existence of a
negative relationship between real GDP growth per capita and di¤erent measures of resource
abundance, such as the ratio of resource exports to GDP.2 The nding that resource rich
countries tend to perform poorly when compared to economies that are not well endowed
with natural resources is clearly paradoxical and require further explanations and naturally
has led to a growing empirical literature.
Most papers in the resource curse literature tend to follow Sachs and Warners cross-
sectional specication introducing new explanatory variables, while others derive theoretical
models that are loosely related to their empirical specication. Some of these papers conrm
Sachs and Warners results, but there is an emerging literature, including Brunnschweiler
and Bulte (2008), which argues that the so-called resource curse paradox does not exist, and
that while resource dependence does not a¤ect growth, resource abundance in fact positively
a¤ects growth. Thus, from the empirical literature, there is no clear cut answer to whether
natural resource abundance is a blessing or a curse. The recent theoretical work of Caselli
and Cunningham (2009) is not conclusive either and, perhaps not surprisingly, can yield
outcomes that are not compatible with the resource curse hypothesis.
While in the short run we would expect that an increase in oil export revenues would put
1For early contributions on the importance of rent seeking in oil exporting economies see Mahdavi (1970)
and Pesaran (1982)
2See also Sachs and Warner (1997) and Sachs and Warner (2001)
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pressure on the real exchange rate, the Dutch disease channel will only harm an economy
in the long run if these oil revenues are short-lived or subject to such volatility that in
some periods oil export revenues are negligible while in other periods they are prominent.
For major oil exporting countries, of which many started oil extraction and exports in the
beginning of the 20th century, the reserve-to-extraction ratio indicates that they are capable
of producing for many more decades even in the absence of new oil eld discoveries or major
advances in oil exploration and extraction technologies.
Figure 1: Oil export revenues to income ratios for major oil exporters
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In the case of Iran, the rst major oil eld was discovered in 1908 with oil production
started owing in sizeable amounts in 1912. Even after 100 years of exploration and pro-
duction, Irans current estimated reserve-to-extraction ratio suggests a further 87 years of
oil production. In addition, Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves after Russia,
around 60 percent of which is yet to be developed.3 Although, it is clear that Irans oil and
gas reserves will be exhausted eventually, this is likely to take place over a relatively long
period. In fact over the past two decades the ratio of Irans oil export revenues to GDP has
uctuated around 26 percent and currently stands at 21.5 percent. Of course, Iran is not
unique in this regard. As Figure 1 shows most other OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries) member countries such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Algeria,
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, and a few countries outside OPEC such as Norway and
Russia have similar oil income GDP ratios that have remained relatively stable (and in some
cases have even been rising as in Norway). There is little evidence to suggest that in these
economies oil income will be diminishing any time soon.
To summarize, most macroeconomic analysis of oil revenues tend to take a short term
perspective. They usually focus on the e¤ects of oil revenues on the real exchange rate (Dutch
disease) and government budget expansion, thus failing to consider the e¤ects of oil revenues
3See, for example, Amuzegar (2008) and BP (2009).
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on long run growth. This approach makes sense for countries with a limited amount of oil
reserves, but not for major oil exporting countries such as Iran. Therefore, the aim of this
section is to develop a long run theory for oil exporters in which oil export revenues a¤ect
the growth rate of income in the long run. In this process rent-seeking and other political
economy considerations are clearly still important, and tend to manifest themselves in the
equilibrium level of capital stock and can inuence the steady state growth of the economy.
However, such political economy considerations will not be addressed in this paper.
2.1 Long Run Output Equation for Oil Exporting Economies
Consider an oil exporting economy with a constant return to scale production function in
labour, Lt, and capital stock, Kt;:
Yt = AtLtf

Kt
AtLt

(1)
where Yt is the real output and At is an index of labour augmented technological progress.
Following the literature it will be assumed that At and Lt are exogenously given and follow
general linear processes dened by
log(At) = a0 + gt+ uat; (2)
and
log (Lt) = l0 + nt+ ult: (3)
where a0 and l0 are economy-specic initial endowments of technology and labour, g and n
are the steady state growth rates of technology and labour input respectively, and uat and
ult follow general linear processes possibly with unit roots.
Denote by Xt the real value of (net) oil exports
Xt =
EtP
o
t X
o
t
Pt
(4)
where P ot is the price of oil per barrel in US dollar, X
o
t is the total number of barrels of oil
exports, Et is the exchange rate in terms of US dollar, and Pt is the consumer price index.
Note that we could also include oil as an input in the production process but we abstract
from this to simplify the analysis. Let t be the value of capital in terms of e¤ective labour
input:
t =
Kt
AtLt
(5)
and t denote the value of real oil exports in terms of e¤ective units of labour input:
t =
Xt
AtLt
(6)
Then the capital accumulation equation can be written as
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + s(t)Yt +  (t)Xt (7)
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where  is the rate of depreciation (0 <  < 1), s(t) and  (t) are the shares of non-oil
output and (net) oil income that are invested and t = (t; t)
0 is the vector of state variables.
It is assumed that s(t) and  (t) lie in the range (0; 1), and oil is produced without the
use of domestic resources.
Using (2) and (3), the general specication for ln(AtLt) is given by:
ln(AtLt) = a0 + l0 + (g + n) t+ ut;
where ut = uat + ult. Hence
 ln(At+1Lt+1) = g + n+ut+1: (8)
Using (8) we can write the capital accumulation equation given in (7) in terms of e¤ective
labour units:
t+1 = [(1  )t + s(t)f (t) +  (t)t] exp ( g   n ut+1) : (9)
Note thatut+1 is a stationary process irrespective of whether the processes for At or Lt have
unit roots. The presence of a unit root in At is, however, essential if log per capita output is
to have a unit root, a hypothesis that cannot be rejected when tested using historical output
series.
To solve for t, the process for real oil revenues must also be specied. Given that oil
revenues are dominated by oil price movements and the latter is best approximated by a
random walk model with a drift, we assume that
 log (Xt+1) = g
o +vt+1 (10)
where go is the drift coe¢ cient, and vt  iid (0; 2v). Given (8) and (10) we have:
 log
 
t+1

= go +vt+1   (g + n+ut+1)
= go   g   n+vt+1  ut+1 (11)
The possibility of a long run impact from oil income to per capita output depends on the
relative growth of oil income (go) relative to the combined growth of labour and technology.
In the case where go < g+n, t ! 0 as t!1, the importance of oil income in the economy
will tend towards zero in the limit and the standard growth model will become applicable.
In this case oil income is neither a blessing nor a curse in the long run. This is as to be
expected since with oil income rising but at a slower pace than the growth of real output, the
share of oil income in aggregate output eventually tends towards zero. Therefore, a resource
could be non-depletable but still have no long run impacts.
But if go  g+ n, oil income continues to exert an independent impact on the process of
capital accumulation even in the long run. Under this case t 6= 0 for all t, and scaling (9)
by t we obtain:
t+1
t+1
=

(1  ) t
t
+ s(t)
f (t)
t
+  (t)

exp ( g   n ut+1) exp
   logt+1 : (12)
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Denoting the scaled variables by v such that ezt = zt=t, and using (11) we then have
et+1 = [(1  ) et + s(t)eyt +  (t)] exp ( go  vt+1) :
where eyt = yt=t = f(t)=t. In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, f (t) = t ;
where 0 <  < 1 is the share of capital, we have
et+1 = [(1  ) et + s(t)~t +  (t)] exp ( go  vt+1) : (13)
where s(t) = s(t)=
1 
t = s(t)
 (1 )
0 e
 (1 )(go g n)t (1 )(vt ut). We need now to con-
sider the cases where go > g + n, and go = g + n, separately. Under the former and since
1    > 0, and s(t) is bounded in t, then limt!1 s(t) = 0; and for su¢ ciently large t
(13) behaves as et+1 = [(1  ) et +  (t)] exp ( go  vt+1) ;
and  = limt!1et will exits so long as E [(1  ) exp ( go  vt+1)] < 1. In the case where
vt is normally distributed this condition can be written as go > 2v + ln(1   ), and will
be satised if growth of oil income is not too volatile. Based on historical data on real oil
prices, v is around 20 per cent per annum, and taking  = :05 we would then need that
go > 0:04  0:0513 which is clearly met in practice.
In the knife-edge case where go = g+n, the limiting distribution of et will be the function
of both saving rates (savings out of domestic output and oil income) and will be ergodic only
if certain regularity conditions on s(t)=et and  (t) =et are met. Note that in the present
case s(t) = s(t)
 (1 )
0 e
 (1 )(vt ut). Following Binder and Pesaran (1999), and assuming
that s(t)=et and  (t) =et are monotonic in t and that certain regularity conditions hold,
then it can be shown that as t!1, et+1 ! e, where e is a time-invariant random variable
with a non-degenerate probability distribution function.
To summarize, subject to familiar regularity conditions, we have
lnt+1  I (0) , if go < g + n; (14)
and
ln et+1 = lnt+1   lnt+1  I (0) , if go  g + n; (15)
where I(0) represents a stationary (integrated of order 0) variable.Also since under a Cobb-
Douglas production function
lnt = 
 1 [ln(Yt=Lt)  ln (At)]
then in terms of per capita output we have
ln(Yt=Lt)  ln (At)  I (0) , if go < g + n; (16)
and
ln(Yt=Lt)  (1  ) lnAt    ln(Xt=Lt)  I (0) , if go  g + n: (17)
Therefore, the issue of whether oil income is likely to have a lasting impact on per capita
output growth can be tested by a cointegration analysis involving log per capita output, log
of real per capita oil income and an index of technological progress. In such an empirical
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analysis it is important that At can be measured independently of oil income. With this
in mind and following Garratt, Lee, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) we assume that domestic
technology evolves from a di¤usion and adaptation of foreign technology denoted by At .
Specically we assume that
ln(At) = a

0 +  ln(A

t ) + t; (18)
where  measures the extent to which foreign technology is di¤used and adapted successfully
by the domestic economy in the long run, t represents the transient di¤erences between the
levels of technological innovations, and a0 is a xed scaling factor. If  < 1; this implies that
the domestic technology is falling behind the rest of the world, while  > 1 implies that the
domestic technology is quickly catching up and outperforming foreign technological growth,
while  = 1 represents the case where domestic and foreign technology are assumed to grow
at the same rate.
Denoting foreign capital stock in e¤ective labour units by t , and assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function we have (using the same specication as above but without oil
income)
ln (Y t =L

t )  lnAt =  ln(t )  I (0) ;
This result together with (18) now yields
ln(At)   (Y t =Lt )  I (0) ;
which upon substitution in (16) and (17) gives the following long run relations in observables
ln(Yt=Lt)   ln (Y t =Lt )  I (0) , if go < g + n; (19)
and
ln(Yt=Lt)  (1  ) ln (Y t =Lt )   ln(Xt=Lt)  I (0) , if go  g + n: (20)
For the purpose of econometric modeling the long run interactions of real oil income with
the other variables in the economy, it is convenient to decompose ln (Xt=Lt) as
ln (Xt=Lt) = ln(Et=Pt) + ln(P
o
t X
o
t =Lt);
where the rst component, the real exchange rate, is treated as endogenous, and the second
component, the per capita oil income in US dollars, can be viewed as exogenous for estimation
purposes. Using this in (20) now yields
ln(Yt=Lt)  (1  ) ln (Y t =Lt )   ln(Et=Pt)   ln(P ot Xot =Lt)  I (0) , if go  g + n:
For empirical applications the analysis can be simplied if ln(Lt) and ln(Lt ) are trend sta-
tionary so that
ln(Lt)  n t  I (0) and ln(Lt )  n t  I (0) ,
where n and n are labour force growth rates of domestic and world economy. This allows for
the possibility of both foreign and domestic demand shocks as long as they are temporary,
or in other words I (0). In this case the long run output equations become
ln(Yt)   ln (Y t )  (n  n)t  I (0) , if go < g + n; (21)
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and
ln(Yt)   1 ln (Y t )   2 ln(Et=Pt)   3 ln(P ot Xot )  t  I (0) , if go  g + n: (22)
where
 1 = (1   2);  2 =  3 = ; and  = (1  )(n  n): (23)
Equation (22) is su¢ ciently general and covers both cases where go < g+n and go  g+n:
Under the former  1 = ,  2 =  3 = 0, whilst under the latter  2 =  3 6= 0. The above
formulation also allows us to test other hypothesis of interest concerning  and . The
value of  provides information on the long run di¤usion of technology to the oil exporting
economy. The di¤usion of technology is at par with the rest of the world if  = 1, whilst
a value of  below unity suggests ine¢ ciency that prevents the adoption of best practice
techniques, possibly due to rent-seeking activities. When  = 1 steady state per capita
output growth in the oil exporting economy can only exceed that of the rest of the world
if oil income per capita is rising faster than the steady state per capita output in the rest
of the world. The steady state output growth in the oil exporting economy could be lower
than the rest of the world per capita output growth if  < 1. In case of the most resource
abundant economies, where go < g + n, their steady state growth rates cannot exceed that
of the rest of the world unless  > 1. The empirical literature which is based on cross
section regressions most likely captures short term deviations from the steady states and in
view of the substantial heterogeneity that exists across countries can be quite misleading,
particularly as far as identication of  and inferences on management ine¢ ciency of resource
abundant economies are concerned.
In what follows we estimate  and the other parameters of the long run output equation,
(22), by embedding it within a vector error correcting model of the Iranian economy esti-
mated on quarterly observations over the past 28 years since the 1979 Revolution. To this
end we rst re-write the output equation as
yt    1yt =  2(et   pt) +  3xot + cy + yt+ y;t (24)
where yt = ln(Yt), yt = ln(Y

t ), et = ln(Et), pt = ln(Pt), xot = ln(X
o
t P
o
t ), cy is a xed
constant, and y;t is a mean zero stationary process, which represents the error correction
term of the long run output equation. In addition to the output equation we also consider
the real money demand equation (MD),
mt   pt = 1yt + 2(pt   pt 1) + cmp + mpt++mp;t; (25)
where mpt = mt pt is real money balances, and mp;t is the stationary error correcting term
for the MD equation.
A number of other long run relations considered in the literature, namely the purchasing
power parity (PPP), the uncovered interest parity and the Fisher equation could also be
included, see Garratt, Lee, Pesaran, and Shin (2006) for further details. But we have not been
able to include these in our analysis as available data on interest rates are administratively
determined, changed only at infrequent intervals, and as such do not reect the market
conditions. The money supply also comes to play an important role in the Iranian economy,
since the capital markets are not developed in Iran. For the same reason we have used the
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ination rate, t = pt pt 1 rather than the interest rate in the MD equation specied above.
Ination rate could be a good proxy for short term interest rate assuming that the Fisher
equation holds, at least in the long run. The analysis of PPP in Iran is also complicated by a
prolonged period of black market in foreign exchange and the existence of multiple exchange
rates, see Pesaran (1992). Also, to include a PPP relationship in the model, we need to
introduce an e¤ective exchange rate in addition to the US dollar rate, Et. However, as a
result of US sanctions only a very small fraction of Irans trade is conducted with the US, and
the use of US price level as a proxy for foreign prices will not be appropriate. Further work
is clearly need before a PPP relation can be added to the model in a satisfactory manner.
Our modelling strategy closely follows Garratt et al. (2003, 2006) and estimate a coin-
tegrating VARX* model with xt = (yt;mpt; t; et   pt)0 as the endogenous variables, and
xt = (y

t ; xot)
0 as the exogenous variables. But before giving the details of the economet-
ric model, we rst discuss the data and the main economic trends of the Iranian economy
over the period 1979Q1-2006Q4. A review of the macroeconometric modelling literature for
the Iranian economy is also provided to better place our contribution within the existing
literature, but since it is not central to our main arguments it is relegated to Appendix A.
3 Macroeconomic Trends in Iran Since the 1979 Rev-
olution
Irans economy has gone through two major phases since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The
rst phase was the aftermath of the Revolution and eight years of war with Iraq. Those years
were characterized by mobilization of resources to deal with internal and external conicts,
massive extension of government controls over rms and markets, and e¤orts to dene the
institutions of the new political system, the Islamic Republic. The second phase started in
1989 with post-war reconstruction and a series of economic and institutional reforms. After
a few years of market-oriented reforms, the government proceeded to liberalize the foreign
exchange market and open up the capital account in 1993. But, the process was not managed
well and the country quickly accumulated a huge stock of short-term external debt, followed
by a major balance of payments crisis in 1993-1994, see Pesaran (2000) and Esfahani and
Pesaran (2009). The debt crisis put the reform program on hold and even reversed it in
many areas, especially in the credit and foreign exchange markets. After the mid-1990s, a
process of gradual change began in which the government tried to deal with the economys
problems in a more cautious manner.
The performance of real GDP since early 1979 is depicted in Figure 2. Before the Rev-
olution of February 1979, the Iranian economy was already on a downward trend. But, it
went into a tailspin that lowered the real GDP by almost a quarter of its 1979Q1 value
in the two subsequent years. Part of the problem was the redistributive and political con-
icts that undermined the production and investment incentives. The government quickly
took over all large rms and all banks and nancial companies, restricted trade and capi-
tal movements, and expropriated the properties of those believed to be associated with the
Shahs regime. Property rights came into question more generally and the economy began
to witness a major exodus of skilled labor. The costly war with Iraq during 1980-1988 also
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caused destruction of property and infrastructure and increasingly drained resources away
from productive investment (Figure 2).
A sharp drop in oil revenues between 1980 and 1982 must have also contributed to the
decline in real GDP, see Figure 3. Indeed, as oil revenues rose in 1982-1984 and then dropped
again during 1984-1986, the real GDP followed suit. Similar co-movements, especially long
term ones, can be seen after the end of the war in 1988 as well (Figure 3). The rise of oil
revenues during 1989-1991 helped the Iranian economys quick recovery from the war and
the decline of those revenues in 1993 triggered the balance of payments crisis that pushed
Irans real GDP below its trend until the late 1990s. On the other hand, the recovery of oil
prices in 2000 and especially after 2002 ushered in a period of relatively high growth that, so
far, has lasted several years. As described in Section 2.1 we model this association between
oil revenues and real GDP in the long run and conrm its existence and signicance in our
econometric exercise in Section 5.2.
Oil revenues have also had an important impact on the real exchange rate. The decline
in oil revenues in the mid-1990s increased the purchasing power of the dollar in terms of
domestic output, a process that has been reversed since the late 1990, see Figure 4. Before
the mid-1990s, the connection between the two variables was di¤erent because at that time
the government controlled both foreign trade and the foreign exchange market much more
tightly and tried to keep the real exchange rate of the dollar low by suppressing the demand
for imports. These controls became tighter when oil revenues declined, inducing a positive
correlation between foreign earnings and the real price of the dollar (Figure 4). Such inter-
ventions must have had adverse e¤ects on the real GDP for a number of reasons. Besides
causing ine¢ cient allocation and discouraging exports, lower real value of the dollar meant
that oil revenues could buy less domestic goods and resulted slower capital formation. Our
econometric results are consistent with this claim.
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Figure 3: Oil export revenues (xo) and deviation of domestic from foreign output
(y-ys)
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Figure 4: Real exchange rate (ep) and deviation of domestic from foreign output
(y-ys)
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Figure 5: Ination (dp) and deviation of domestic from foreign output (y-ys)
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Tightening of market controls in response to shocks was also a means of controlling
ination. However, those measures could not work beyond the short or medium term and
often resulted in high ination in the longer run. Institutional weaknesses in managing money
supply, aggregate demand, and the operation of the markets in general also often manifested
themselves in heightened ination. As Figure 5 shows, the rate of ination rose sharply in
the early 1980s when the economy was grappling with internal political instability, external
conict, and declining oil revenues. The government managed to use money expansion and
rationing of goods to keep up the real balances in those years (Figure 6). In 1984 and 1985,
the recovery of oil revenues helped lower ination and raise output. But, the drop in oil
prices in 1986 and the continuation of the war led to a sharp rise in ination and the collapse
of aggregate output and real balances until 1989 (Figure 6).
End of war with Iraq and the start of reconstruction briey lowered ination and boosted
real balances (Figures 5 and 6). But, deregulation of many markets and a large deprecia-
tion of the rial (see Figure 4) allowed prices to jump up in 1990. This was followed by a
rapid expansion of credit and scal spending, which fueled ination during the early 1990s.
Increased imports and output growth were gradually lowering ination when the balance
of payments crisis of 1993-1994 broke out and led to shortage of imports and a signicant
depreciation of the rial. At the same time, the policy-makers decided to compensate those
who owed foreign debt for their losses due to the depreciation. These developments jointly
sent ination soaring in 1995 and brought down real balances sharply (Figures 5 and 6). In
the following years, the government managed to bring down the rate of ination to more
moderate rates and stabilize the real balances, see Amuzegar (1997). Once the economy
proved stable in the early 2000s, real balances took o¤ and soon regained its position rela-
tive to the real GDP (Figure 6). However, in recent years, as oil revenues have increased, the
governments monetary and scal policies have become quite expansionary and have raised
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Figure 6: Real money balances (mp) and domestic output (y)
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ination to higher levels again.
4 A VARX* Error Correcting Model for Iran
In this section we begin by showing how the two long run relations given by (24) and (25)
can be embodied in a vector error correcting model. We rst note that the two long run
relations can be written compactly as deviations from equilibrium:
t = 
0zt   c  t (26)
where
zt = (x
0
t;x
0
t )
0 = (yt, mpt, t, ept, yt , xot)
0 ;
c = (cy; cmp)
0;  = (y; mp)
0; t =
 
yt, mp;t
0
and

0
=
 1 0 0  2  1  3
1  1 2 0 0 0

(27)
The long run theory for oil exporting countries, as derived in Section 2.1, require two
further restrictions on the output equation (24) for Iran, namely  2 =  3 =  and  1 =
 (1  ), where we are interested in seeing whether in fact the coe¢ cients of the real ex-
change rate and total oil revenues from oil exports are the same and equal to the share of
capital in output () and whether technological progress in Iran is on par with that of the
rest of the world, in other words whether  = 1, and as a result the coe¢ cient of the foreign
real output is equal to (1  ).
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The VARX*(s; s) model that embodies t is constructed from a suitably restricted ver-
sion of the VAR in zt. In the present application zt = (x0t;x
0
t )
0 is partitioned into the 4 1
vector of endogenous variables, xt = (yt, mpt, t, ept) ; and the 2  1 vector of the weakly
exogenous variables, xt = (y

t , xot)
0. Also as shown in Appendix C, the hypothesis that all
the six variables are I(1) cannot be rejected. Moreover, it is easily established that the two
exogenous variables are not cointegrated. Under these conditions, following Pesaran, Shin,
and Smith (2000), the VAR in zt can be decomposed into the conditional model for the
endogenous variables:
xt =  xzt 1 +
s 1X
i=1
	ixt i +0xt +
s 1X
i=1
ix

t i + a0 + a1t+ t; (28)
and the marginal model for the exogenous variables:
xt =
s 1X
i=1
 izt i + b0 + uxt; (29)
If the model includes an unrestricted linear trend, in general there will be quadratic trends
in the level of the variables when the model contains unit roots. To avoid this, the trend
coe¢ cients are restricted such that a1 = x; where  is an 6 1 vector of free coe¢ cients,
see Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2000) and Section 6.3 in Garratt, Lee, Pesaran, and Shin
(2006). The nature of the restrictions on a1 depends on the rank of x. In the case where
x is full rank, a1 is unrestricted, whilst it is restricted to be equal to 0 when the rank of
x is zero. Under the restricted trend coe¢ cients the conditional model can be written as
xt =  x [zt 1   (t  1)] +
s 1X
i=1
	ixt i +0xt +
s 1X
i=1
ix

t i + ~a0 + t; (30)
where ~a0 = a0 + x. We refer to this specication as the vector error correcting model
with weakly exogenous I(1) variables, or VECX*(s; s) for short. Note that ~a0 remains
unrestricted since a0 is not restricted. While for consistent and e¢ cient estimation (and
inference) we only require the conditional model as specied in (28), for impulse response
analysis and forecasting we need the full system vector error correction model which also
includes the marginal model; as such we need to specify the process driving the weakly
exogenous variables, xt .
The long run theory imposes a number of restrictions on x and . First, for the
conditional model to embody the equilibrium errors dened by, (26), we must have x =
x
0, which in turn implies that rank(x) = 2. Furthermore, the restrictions on the trend
coe¢ cients are given by
x = x
0 = :
Since under cointegration x 6= 0, it then follows that a trend will be absent from the long
run relations if one of the two elements of 0 is equal to zero. These restrictions are known
as co-trending restrictions, meaning that the linear trends in the various variables of the
long run relations gets cancelled out. This hypothesis is important in the analysis of output
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convergence between domestic and the foreign variables, since without such a co-trending
restriction the two output series will diverge even if they are shown to be co-integrated.
The theory also imposes a number of long run over-identifying restrictions on the elements
of . The total number of over-identifying restrictions is given by 12 4 = 8, and there are 4
structural parameters to be estimated, ; ; 1 and 2. This leaves us with 4 over-identifying
restrictions to test.
5 Long Run Estimates and Tests
5.1 Order Selection and Deterministic Components
We propose to use the VECX*(s; s) model dened by (30) to test the various long run
theory restrictions set out above. First we need to determine the lag orders s and s in the
VARX*(s; s) model.4 For this purpose we use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) applied to the underlying unrestricted VARX* model.
The results are summarized in Table 1. SBC selects the lag orders s^ = s^ = 1; whilst, as to
be expected, AIC selects a higher order lag for the endogenous variables, namely s^ = 2 and
s^ = 1. We follow AIC and base our analysis on the VARX*(2,1), since under-estimating
the lag orders is generally more serious than overestimating them.
Table 1: Lag order selection criteria
Lag length AIC SBC
s = 1 s = 1 1455.32 1327.48
s = 1 s = 2 1445.35 1277.14
s = 2 s = 1 1459.09 1297.61
s = 2 s = 2 1451.63 1249.78
Notes: AIC refers to the Akaike Information Criterion and SBC refers to the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion.
As to the deterministic variables included in our model we make use of both a constant
and a linear trend. As a trend may or may not be found in the long run relations we also
test for co-trending restrictions given by 0 = 0. We also experimented with including a
war and revolution (WR) dummy amongst the determinstics. The WR dummy takes the
value of 1 between 1979 quarter 1 and 1988 quarter 2 and zeros outside this period, and is
intended to capture the joint e¤ects of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the war with Iraq
which lasted from September 1980 until August 1988. The WR dummy could also pick up
the e¤ects of economic liberalisation that took place after the ending of the Iran-Iraq war.
But as we shall argue in Section 5.2.3 below, once xot, the oil exports variable, is included
in the model the WR dummy ceases to be statistically signicant.
4All estimations and test results are obtained using Microt 5.0. For further technical details see Pesaran
and Pesaran (2009), Section 22.10.
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5.2 Estimation and Testing of the Long Run Relations
Having established the order of VARX* to be (2,1) we need to determine the number of
cointegrating relations given by r = rank(x), where x is dened by (30). Cointegration
tests with null hypothesis of no cointegration, one cointegrating relation, and so on are carried
out using Johansens maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics as developed in Pesaran, Shin,
and Smith (2000) for models with weakly exogenous regressors. The test results are reported
in Table 2. Both the maximal eigenvalue and the trace statistics suggest the presence of two
cointegrating relations at the 5 per cent level, which is the same as that suggested by economic
theory, thus we set r = 2:
Table 2: Cointegration rank test statistics for the VARX*(2,1) model with en-
dogenous variables (y, mp, dp, ep) and the weakly exogenous variables (y*, xo)
H0 H1 Test statistic 95% Critical Values 90% Critical Values
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 55.84 41.93 38.29
r  1 r = 2 40.31 33.79 31.23
r  2 r = 3 24.66 26.26 23.93
r  3 r = 4 6.30 17.73 16.08
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 127.11 90.44 84.24
r  1 r = 2 71.27 60.13 56.47
r  2 r = 3 30.97 36.97 34.02
r  3 r = 4 6.30 17.73 16.08
Notes: The underlying VARX* model is of order (2,1) and contains unrestricted intercept and
restricted trend coe¢ cients. yt and xot are treated as weakly exogenous, non-cointegrated I(1)
variables. The test statistics refer to Johansens log-likelihood-based maximum eigenvalue and
trace statistics and are computed using 109 observations from 1979Q4 to 2006Q4.
In order to exactly identify the long run relations, we must impose 4 restrictions, 2
restrictions on each of the 2 cointegration relations. The choice of the exactly identifying
restrictions is econometrically innocuous and is best guided by economic theory. We proceed
by taking the rst cointegrating relation to be the output equation, dened by equation (24)
and normalised on yt, and the second one the money demand equation, dened by (25) and
normalised on mpt = mt pt. Accordingly, we start with the following two exactly identied
cointegrating vectors

0
EX =
 1 0 13 14 15 16
21  1 23 24 0 26

; (31)
where the rows of 
0
EX correspond to zt = (yt, mpt, t, ept, y

t , xot)
0. Using this exactly
identied specication we then test the co-trending restrictions, 0 =  = (y; mp)
0 = 0.
The log-likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for jointly testing the two co-trending restrictions takes
the value 10.15, and is asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared variate with two degrees
of freedom. Therefore, based on the asymptotic distribution the co-trending restrictions
are rejected. But we are working with a relatively large dimensional VARX* model using
a moderate number of time series observations. In such situations it is known that the
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LR tests could over-reject in small samples (see, for example, Gredenho¤ and Jacobson
(2001) as well as Gonzalo (1994), Haug (1996) and Abadir, Hadri, and Tzavalis (1999)).
To deal with the small sample problem we computed bootstrapped critical values based on
1,000 replications of the LR statistic. Using the observed initial values of each variable, the
estimated model, and a set of random innovations, an articial data set is generated for
each of the 1,000 replications under the assumption that the estimated version of the model
is the true data-generating process. For each of the replicated data sets, we rst estimate
our VECX* model subject to the exact identifying restrictions in (31) and then subject to
the two co-trending restrictions. Finally, the empirical distribution of the LR test statistic
is derived using the 1,000 replications. Having applied this technique, the bootstrapped
critical value for the joint test of the two co-trending restrictions is 10.20 at the 5 percent
level, and 15.22 at the 1 percent level, as compared to the LR statistic of 10.15. Hence,
based on the bootstrapped critical values the co-trending restrictions cannot be rejected at
the conventional levels of signicance, although the outcome of the test at the 5 percent level
is rather marginal and is subject to the random variation of the bootstrapped critical values.
We shall, therefore, impose the co-trending restrictions whilst considering the other theory
restrictions, and return to them to see if they continue to be supported by the data once the
other restrictions are imposed.
5.2.1 Testing Long Run Theory Restrictions
We rst consider the theory restrictions on the output equation whilst maintaining the exact
identifying restrictions on the second long run relation. Initially we impose the restriction
that the coe¢ cients of ept and xot are the same, namely that in (31) 14 = 16 = . We
obtain the estimates
 ^1 = 0:6931
(0:2183)
;  ^2 =  ^3 = ^ = 0:3140
(0:1100)
;
with the LR statistic of 10.52 for testing the three restrictions. The gures in brackets are
asymptotic standard errors. The additional restriction has only marginally increased the LR
statistic and is clearly not rejected. In fact the bootstrapped critical values for the test is
now 11.91 at the 5 percent level and 17.12 at the 1 percent level. The implicit estimate of 
given by 0:6931=(1  0:3140) = 1:01 is very close to unity and the null hypothesis that  = 1
cannot be rejected, thus implying that the technological growth in Iran is on par with that
o¤ the rest of the world. Under  = 1 we have 15 + 14 = 1, and imposing this additional
restriction the LR statistic increases only marginally from 10.5181 to 10.5198. However, the
estimate of , representing the share of capital, is relatively low, although not far from what
is being considered in the literature for Iran, for instance see Mojaver (2009) in which he
considers a range of 0.33 to 0.45 for . In addition, the coe¢ cient of t in the long run output
equation is ^13 =  14:72 (5:91), which is statistically signicant, implying that ination has
a negative e¤ect on real output which is not supported by the long run theory. This negative
e¤ect suggests ine¢ ciencies in both the institutions and economic policies in Iran and shows
the importance of controlling ination for growth promotion in Iran.
Consider now the second long run equation. The theory restrictions in terms of the
elements of  in (31) are
24 = 0; and 26 = 0:
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Imposing these additional restrictions on  yields
 = 1, ^ = 0:2333
(0:0465)
, ^13 =   13:06
(4:01)
;
^1 = 0:8277
(0:1231)
; ^2 =  14:53
(6:09)
:
The long run income elasticity of money demand is close to unity and the null hypothesis
that it is equal to 1 cannot be rejected. The e¤ect of ination on real money balances is also
negative and statistically signicant. This is in line with our earlier discussion that ination
in the money demand equation acts as a proxy for the interest rate. In fact it would be a
perfect proxy if it can be assumed that the Fisher parity holds in Iran. Imposing 1 = 1 and
re-estimating subject to all the seven over-identifying restrictions we obtain
 = 1; ^ = 0:2647
(0:0489)
, ^13 =  13:84
(4:37)
;
1 = 1; ^2 =  16:37
(6:79)
:
The LR statistic for testing all the 7 restrictions jointly is 23.34 which is to be compared
to the bootstrapped critical values of 21.59 and 30.99 at the 5 and 1 percent signicance
levels, respectively. Therefore, the restrictions are rejected at 5 percent level, but not at
the 1 percent level. The test outcome is inconclusive and further investigation seems in
order. We considered relaxing some of the restrictions in the real money demand equation
and found that the primary source of the rejection of the restrictions is the zero restriction
imposed on the coe¢ cient of the real exchange rate variable. Once this restriction is relaxed
the following estimates are obtained
 = 1; ^ = 0:2467
(0:0600)
, ^13 =  12:06
(3:36)
;
1 = 1; ^2 =  1:91
(2:99)
, ^24 =  0:2380
(0:0496)
:
There are now six over-identifying restrictions on the long run relations, and the LR statistic
for testing these restrictions is 13.37 as compared to the bootstrapped critical values of 16.29
and 19.34 at the 10 and 5 percent signicance levels, respectively. Clearly, the restrictions
are not rejected even at the 10 percent signicance level. This is reassuring particularly
as far as the long run estimates of the output equation is concerned, since whether 24 is
restricted or not seems to have little e¤ects on the estimates of the output equation, which
is the focus of the present investigation. However, relaxing 24 = 0 does signicantly a¤ect
the ination elasticity of the money demand which is reduced from  16:37 to  1:91 and is
no longer statistically signicant.
We are presented with a clear choice. Should we maintain the theory restrictions which
are rejected at the 5 percent level, although not at the 1 percent level, or should we opt for
the new specication of the real money demand equation that includes the et   pt variable
which is di¢ cult to justify in an economically meaningful sense. Given that we are primarily
interested in the long run e¤ects of oil exports for real output, and the choice of the real
money demand equation does not seem to play a central role for that issue, in the rest of
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the paper we shall maintain the theory consistent money demand equation since it is easier
to interpret. Also, since the theory restrictions are not rejected at the 1 percent level, our
adherence to a theory consistent real money demand equation is not without some empirical
foundations.
Furthermore, the theory consistent specications are robust to alternative measurements
of foreign output and the exchange rate. For instance, estimating the VECX* model with
foreign output computed using xed weights based on the average of three consecutive years
(2001-2003), yield similar outcomes
 = 1; ^ = 0:2311
(0:0432)
, ^13 =  17:13
(5:08)
;
1 = 1; ^2 =  16:06
(6:30)
;
to when we use foreign output based on time-varying weights (yt ), with the 7 over-identifying
restriction now not being rejected at the 5 percent signicance level.
5.2.2 Free and O¢ cial Exchange Rates
As noted earlier, a similar issue of measurement also arises with respect to the exchange
rate. Since the 1979 Revolution the Iranian rial has depreciated signicantly against the US
dollar under a variety of exchange rate regimes from a xed rate to multiple rates and back
to a unied pegged managed rate. It has depreciated from 70 rials per US dollar in 1979
to 9170 rials in 2006, or around 131 fold increase, see Pesaran (1984) and Pesaran (2000).
Figure 7 shows (in logs) the free rate (or black market in certain periods), et , and the o¢ cial
exchange rate , eOF;t, over the period 1979Q1-2006Q4. The two rates are at par at the start
of the Revolution but depart soon thereafter. They are, however, brought in line by two
major jumps the last of which is associated with the successful unication of the exchange
rates during Khatamis Presidency in 2002.
To investigate the robustness of our results to the choice of the exchange rate we employ
a geometrically weighted average of the free and the o¢ cial rates, e!;t = !et + (1  !)eOF;t.
The weights ! : (1   !) are intended to reect the proportion of imports by public and
private agencies that are traded at the two exchange rates, on average. There is little hard
evidence on !, although due to the gradual attempts at currency unication, it is reasonable
to expect ! to have risen over time. Initially we set ! = 0:75, but smaller values of ! = 0:70
and 0:60 resulted in very similar estimates and test outcomes. Using e!;t with ! = 0:75 we
could not reject the 7 over-identifying restrictions even at the 10 percent level, since the LR
statistic is 18.65 as compared to the bootstrapped critical values of 19.10 and 22.67 at the
10 and 5 percent signicance levels, respectively. For ! = 0:75 we obtained the following
estimates:
 = 1; ^ = 0:1964
(0::0308)
, ^13 =  8:97
(2:55)
;
1 = 1; ^2 =  16:01
(6:84)
;
which yield a smaller capital share of 0.1964 as compared to 0.2647, with the coe¢ cient
of ination in the output equation still negative and statistically signicant. However, the
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Figure 7: Free and o¢ cial exchange rates
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ination elasticity of money demand, -16.01, is roughly the same as in the case when we use
the oating exchange rate, et. Given that we do not know what these weights should be, for
now we will proceed by only reporting the results when using the free exchange rate in our
model, but we will return to this issue when looking at the short run dynamics.5
5.2.3 Including a War and Revolution Dummy
To see if the model captures the e¤ects of the 1979 Islamic Revolution as well as the war with
Iraq, which lasted from September 1980 until August 1988 and the economic liberalisation
that followed after the war, we introduce a war and revolution dummy. This dummy takes
the value of unity over the period 1979Q1 to 1988Q2, and zero otherwise. As before both
the maximal eigenvalue and the trace statistics indicate the presence of two cointegrating
relations at the 5 percent level.6 Setting r = 2 and imposing the same over-identifying
restrictions as in the above Sub-sections, namely:
0 =  = 0;
14 = 16 = ;
15 + 14 = 1 =)  = 1;
21 = 1 =) 1 = 1;
24 = 0; and 26 = 0;
5We also estimated the VARX* model with e0:75;t and the foreign output variable constructed using xed
weights and obtained very similar estimates. These results are available upon request.
6The inclusion of the dummy variable changes the critical values of the test. The test statistics and the
associated critical values are available on request.
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and re-estimating subject to the seven over-identifying restrictions we obtain
 = 1; ^ = 0:2870
(0:0647)
, ^13 =  20:81
(12:57)
;
1 = 1; ^2 =  18:48
(14:94)
:
The LR statistic for testing all the 7 restrictions jointly is 24.02 which is to be compared
to the bootstrapped critical values of 22.30 and 29.09 at 5% and 1% signicance levels,
respectively. Therefore, as before the restrictions are rejected at 5% level, but not at the
1% level. The estimates are fairly similar to the case when we do not include the war and
revolution dummy, with the long run negative e¤ects of ination on real output still present,
although now statistically less signicant than previously. Table 3 reports the coe¢ cient
of the war and revolution dummy in the error correction equations where we observe that
the war and revolution dummy is clearly insignicant at the 10 percent level in the real
exchange rate and the ination equations, while it is signicant at the 10 percent level for
the real money equation and signicant at the 5 percent level in the output equation. These
estimates suggest only a modest average decline in real output due to revolution and war,
once the e¤ects of the declines in real oil exports are taken into account.
Table 3: Reduced-form error correction equations of the VECX*
Equation yt mpt t ept
WR Dummy  0:016993

(0:0063355)
 0:0086472
(0:0047351)
0:0045923
(0:0039030)
0:0078659
(0:026624)
Notes:  denotes signicance at the 5 percent level and  denotes signicance at the 10 percent level.
This point is clearly illustrated using Figure 8 which shows the signicant drop in oil
exports in the aftermath of the revolution, which only begins to recover in a sustained
manner after the end of the war with Iraq. In e¤ect, the decline in oil exports, partly due
to the economic disruptions, in turn puts further downward pressure on the real economy.
Although the price of oil declined slightly and steadily between 1979 and 1986, this was not
the case for Iranian revenues from oil exports which drop signicantly after the revolution
and again at the start of the Iran-Iraq war while on the other hand was at a higher level
than the price of oil after the war. Thus, the negative e¤ects of the war and revolution is
largely picked up by the oil export variable, xot.
However, if we had followed the literature and instead of total revenue from oil exports,
xot, used the nominal price of oil, pot , in our model, then the war and revolution dummy
would have been necessary for modelling the disruptive e¤ects of the revolution and the war
on the real economy. In the light of these observations, we will work with the model with
the xot variable included, but without the the war and revolution dummy.
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Figure 8: Price of oil and revenue from oil exports (xo)
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5.2.4 Import Weights as Opposed to Trade Weights
We also estimated our model with foreign output computed using import weights, both xed
and time-varying, rather than trade weights. The cointegration rank test statistics for the
VARX* (2,1) model with the data vector dened by zt =

yt, mpt, t, ept, yt;IM , xot
	
, where
yt;IM is real foreign output using time-varying import weights, again suggest the presence
of two long run relations. Imposing the same 7 over-identifying restrictions as before and
re-estimating we obtain
 = 1; ^ = 0:2702
(0:0487)
, ^13 =  13:79
(4:20)
;
1 = 1; ^2 =  16:02
(6:47)
:
The LR statistic for testing all the 7 restrictions jointly is now 28.65 which is to be compared
to the bootstrapped critical values of 21.79 and 30.43 at 5% and 1% signicance levels,
respectively. The results are very similar to the ones reported in the above Sub-sections,
and shows that the choice of the weights in the construction of the foreign variable is of
second order importance. However, given the important changes that have taken place in
the geographical composition of the Iranian foreign trade since the revolution, gradually
shifting Irans trade from the West to the East, in what follows we use the time-varying
trade weights as in Section 5.2.
6 Short Run Dynamics
The estimated model can also be used to examine the dynamic responses of the Iranian
economy to various types of shocks, in particular shocks to oil exports and foreign output.
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Initially, we consider the e¤ects of system wide shocks on the cointegrating relations using the
persistence proles, developed by Lee and Pesaran (1993) and Pesaran and Shin (1996). On
impact the persistence proles (PP) are normalized to take the value of unity, but the rate at
which they tend to zero provide information on the speed with which equilibrium correction
takes place in response to shocks. The PP could initially over-shoot, thus exceeding unity, but
must eventually tend to zero if the long run relationship under consideration is cointegrating.
To investigate the e¤ects of variable specic shocks on the Iranian economy we make use
of the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs), developed in Koop, Pesaran, and
Potter (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998). Unlike the orthogonalized impulse responses
popularized in macroeconomics by Sims (1980), the GIRFs are invariant to the ordering of
the variables in the VARX* model.
6.1 Persistence Proles
Figure 9 depicts of the e¤ect of a system-wide shock to the cointegrating relations with 95
percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The speed of convergence to equilibrium for the
two cointegrating relations are quite fast as compared, for example, with the UK (Garratt,
Lee, Pesaran, and Shin (2006)) and Switzerland (Assenmacher-Wesche and Pesaran (2008)).
The half life of the shock is less than one quarter and the life of the shock is generally less
than eight quarters. Thus the e¤ect of shocks tend to disappear rather quickly. This could be
due to lack of access to capital markets and an absence of a developed domestic capital and
money markets, which allows little possibility for shock absorptions. The recently created
Oil Stabilization Fund could, in principle, if used appropriately act as a shock absorber which
might lead to a more sluggish response of the economy to shocks.
6.2 Generalized Impulse Responses
Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) can be computed for shocks to any of the
variables in the model, but they are more straightforward to interpret in the case of shocks
to the exogenous variables, namely oil exports and foreign output. Consider rst the GIRFs
of a unit shock (equal to one standard error) to oil exports given in Figure 10. These gures
clearly show that a positive shock to oil exports signicantly increases ination, strengthens
the real exchange rate (et   pt), increases real output, but its e¤ect on real money balances
whilst positive it is not statistically signicant. These results are as to be expected, but
also show that the e¤ects of the shock work themselves through the economy rather rapidly.
Note also that these e¤ects tend to be permanent, due to the presence of unit roots in the
underlying variables. Quantitatively, the positive oil export shock increases ination by 0.8
percent per annum, real output by 3.2 percent and results in a real exchange rate appreciation
of around 7.6 percent. The rise in the real exchange rate in the aftermath of the positive
shock to oil exports can also be viewed as supporting the Dutch disease, although here the
rise in the real exchange rate is in fact accompanied with a rise in real output which does
not sit comfortably with those that view the Dutch disease as a resource curse.7
7For a short run macroeconomic analysis where a rise in oil exports induces a rise in real output see
Pesaran (1984).
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Figure 9: The persistence proles of the e¤ect of a system-wide shock to the
cointegrating relations with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds
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Figure 10: Generalized Impulse Responses of a positive unit shock to oil export
revenues (with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds)
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The GIRFs of a unit shock to foreign output are given in Figure 11. By comparison to
the oil export shock these e¤ects are muted and are generally insignicant statistically. By
far the most important e¤ect of the foreign output shock is on the real exchange rate, which
appreciates by 2 per cent and is statistically signicant for the rst 3-4 quarters after the
shock.
Figure 11: Generalized Impulse Responses of a positive unit shock to foreign
output (with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds)
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0 6 12 18 24
Domestic inflation (dp)
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0 6 12 18 24
Domestic real exchange rate (ep)
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0 6 12 18 24
Domestic real money (mp)
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0 6 12 18 24
Domestic output (y)
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0 6 12 18 24
Domestic revenue from oil exports (xo)
6.3 Error-correcting Equations
Using the estimates of the conditional model, (30), the error-correcting property of the
model can also be seen in the size and signicance of the coe¢ cients of the error correcting
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terms, t = (t;y; t;mp)
0, dened by (26). The estimates of the reduced form error correction
equations are given in Table 4, from which we can see that ^t 1;y and ^t 1;mp are both
statistically signicant in the output and real exchange rate equations but not in the real
money and ination equations. There seems to be a dichotomy between the real and the
nancial sides of the economy as far as their responses to disequilibria are concerned with
the real output and real exchange rate adjusting most to shocks.
Table 4: Reduced-form error correction equations of the VECX*
Equation yt mpt t ept
^y;t 1
0:089
(0:029)
0:026
(0:021)
0:028
(0:018)
 0:401
(0:118)
^mp;t 1
 0:047
(0:023)
0:011
(0:017)
 0:008
(0:014)
0:332
(0:093)
yt 1
0:325
(0:094)
0:086
(0:069)
 0:038
(0:058)
 0:184
(0:386)
mpt 1
 0:515
(0:174)
0:052
(0:128)
0:061
(0:106)
0:542
(0:711)
t 1
 0:021
(0:167)
0:232
(0:123)
 0:143
(0:102)
0:335
(0:681)
ept 1
 0:082
(0:023)
 0:016
(0:017)
 0:001
(0:014)
 0:042
(0:094)
yt
0:073
(0:547)
0:111
(0:402)
 0:036
(0:334)
 4:162
(2:235)
xot
0:023
(0:014)
0:009
(0:010)
0:004
(0:008)
0:027
(0:056)
intercept  0:363

(0:144)
 0:005
(0:106)
 0:089
(0:088)
2:157
(0:591)
R2 0:189 0:226 0:138 0:085
R2-AR(p) 0:054
(p=1)
0:158
(p=2)
0:141
(p=2)
0:00
(p=1)
SC: 2(4) 0:71 7:95 11:74 8:17
FF : 2(1) 3:49 0:57 2:18 11:27
N : 2(2) 1:97 2:96 9:56 3354:6
HS : 2(1) 0:22 3:45 9:55 19:91
Notes: The two error correction terms are given by:
y;t = yt + 13:84
(4:37)
t   0:2647
(0:0489)
ept   0:7353
(0:0489)
yt   0:2647
(0:0489)
xot
mp;t = mpt   yt + 16:37
(6:79)
dpt
denotes signicance at the 5 percent level and  denotes signicance at the 10 percent level. SC is a
test for serial correlation, FF a test for functional form, N a test for normality of the errors and HS a
test for heteroscedasticity. Critical values are 3.84 for 2(1), 5.99 for 2(2) and 9.49 for 2(4). R2 is the
adjusted squared multiple correlation coe¢ cient, and R2-AR(p) refers to the R2 of a univariate autoregressive
equation. The sample period is 1979Q1 to 2006Q4.
Turning to the t of the error-correcting equations, the ination and the real money
balances equations seem to be the least satisfactory. In the case of the ination equations
none of the regression coe¢ cients are statistically signicant and it su¤ers from residual
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serial correlation.8 In the case of the real money balances the only signicant coe¢ cient is
that of the lagged ination which is signicant at the 10 percent level. The t of the real
exchange rate equation seems reasonable, considering the general unpredictably of exchange
rates documented in the literature. By contrast the output equation provides a reasonable
explanation, particularly considering the signicant disruptions experienced by the Iranian
economy over the period under study and the fact that no dummy variables are included in
the regressions.
To evaluate the importance of the error correction terms we also estimated univariate au-
toregressive moving average (ARMA) time series equations for the four endogenous variables
in the VARX* model and concluded that an AR(1) specication ts best for the real output
growth (yt), and the real exchange rate changes (ept), and an AR(2) specication for
changes in ination (t) and real money balances ( mpt): The adjusted squared multiple
correlation coe¢ cient of these univariate equations are denoted by R2-AR(p), which needs
to be compared to the R2 of the error correction equations also presented in Table 4. It
is clear that the t of the ECM equation for output at 19 percent is substantially better
than the t of the associated univariate AR(1) equation of only 5.4 percent. The ECM of
the real exchange rate (at 8.5 percent) also ts much better than the univariate equation
(at 0 percent). By contrast the ECM equations for ination and the real money balances
are either worse or not that much better than the univariate alternatives. This seems to be
largely due to the fact that the univariate specications point to a higher order dynamics
for these variables. Unfortunately the available data does not allow us to experiment with
a VARX*(3,1) or VARX*(3,2) specications that might be needed to accommodate such
higher order dynamics.
The actual and tted values for each of the four equations together with the associated
residuals are displayed in Figures 12 . We observe that while there are some large outliers,
especially for the exchange rate equation in the mid 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s
and for output and real money in the early 1990s, the tted values seem to track the main
movements of the dependent variables reasonably well. The presence of large outliers are
reected in the massive rejection of the normality of the errors in the case of the real exchange
rate equation.
8The ination equation also seems to su¤er from multicollinearity since despite the fact that none of its
coe¢ cients are statistically signicant the overall t of the equation is highly signicant.
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Figure 12: Actual, tted, and residuals for the core equations
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper makes a theoretical contribution by showing the conditions under which income
from a resource can have a lasting impact on growth and per capita income. Using this
theoretical insight, it provides a small quarterly model of the Iranian economy, as an example
of a major oil exporting economy, where the long run implications of oil exports for real
output, ination, real money balances, and the real exchange rate are tested. The results
are generally supportive of the long run theory, although they point to certain ine¢ ciencies in
the demand management of the economy that manifest themselves as a signicantly negative
e¤ect of ination on real output, even in the long run. The estimates also suggest a rather
rapid response of the economy to shocks, which could be due to the relatively underdeveloped
nature of the money and capital markets in Iran. Such markets tend to act as shock absorbers
in developed economies during normal conditions, although as we have seen recently, they
can also act as shock magniers during crisis periods.
The research in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. The current
VARX* model is connected to the rest of the world through oil exports and foreign real
output. Although these are clearly the most important channels of the transmission of
shocks to the Iranian economy, there could be others. It would be interesting to see if the
model can be linked to the global model recently developed in Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran,
and Smith (2007), where the di¤erential e¤ects of supply and demand shocks and di¤erent
regional shocks on the Iranian economy could be investigated.
It would also be of interest to investigate the extent to which the long run e¤ects of oil
exports on real output documented in this paper can be found in the case of other major oil
exporters. However, to obtain a su¢ ciently long quarterly series, and to take into account
the particular institutional features of these economies, will present some challenges. The
theoretical results of the paper can also be extended to allow for interactions between the oil
and non-oil sectors and the short term e¤ects of oil price volatility. Such an extension could,
for example, help shed light on the importance of the recently established Oil Stabilization
Fund in Iran or the sovereign wealth funds formed in other oil exporting countries as shock
absorbers.
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Appendix A: Macroeconometric Models of the Iranian
Economy - A Survey of the Literature
The origins of macro-econometric modeling in Iran date back to the early 1970s, when
Habib-Agahi (1971)9 pioneered the practice at the Iranian Plan and Budget Organization
(PBO). Habib-Agahis model contained 8 linear behavioral relations and 7 accounting iden-
tities, linking 3 categories of imports, aggregate output, real disposable income, private and
government consumption and investment expenditures to the size of the development bud-
get, oil and non-oil exports, and foreign loans for development. The model was estimated
using annual time series data over the 1959-1970 period, and formed the basis of the rst
"o¢ cial" macro-econometric model to be developed by the PBO. This was a modest exercise
in macro-econometric modeling, largely reecting the data and computational limitations
prevailing in Iran at the time.
Looking to other models subsequently developed at the PBO, a distinction needs to
be made between the models that were constructed before the 1979 revolution and those
constructed afterwards. The rst model developed at the PBO before the revolution was
a modication of Habib-Agahis model and related non-oil exports to the value added in
agriculture instead of treating it as exogenous. However, the value added in agriculture was
now assumed to be exogenous. The second major macro-econometric model constructed at
the PBO before the revolution was much more detailed, and represented important advances
over the earlier one. It allowed for the e¤ect of relative prices on imports and non-oil exports
demands, contained equations for the determination of a number of key monetary aggregates
and tax revenues, and used a Phillips type wage equation to close the model. The model was
estimated over the period 1961-1975 and was the rst serious empirical attempt at modeling
the interactions of the monetary and real variables in the Iranian economy. However, as with
the other models developed for the Iranian economy there is no systematic documentation
of the models short run predictive performance or its long run properties.
Perhaps not surprisingly, revolution and the subsequent eight-year war with Iraq halted
any serious development of macro-econometric models both inside and outside of the PBO.
But with the ending of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, and the governments attempt at regener-
ation and reconstruction of the economy, once again the problem of economic planning and
the development of appropriate macro-econometric models gained priority. But although
the importance of macro-econometric models was recognized in the formulation of the First
Five-Year Development Plan (1990-94), given the urgency surrounding the formulation of
the First Plan and the limited time available to accomplish the task, serious attempts at
macro-econometric modeling had to wait until after its approval and implementation.
According to o¢ cial accounts, two di¤erent macro-econometric models were utilized in
the formulation of the Second Five-Year Development Plan.10 The rst model, PBO1, con-
tains 25 econometrically estimated behavioral, technical, and institutional relations and a
9The dates in the 1300s are based on the Iranian calendar. The corresponding Gregorian dates are roughly
equal to the Iranian date plus 621. Publications in Persian are cited with the Gregorian dates in the text
but with both the Iranian and the Georgian calendar dates in the references.
10See PBO (1993). Initially the implementation of the Second Five Year Development Plan was intended
to commence in March 1994, but due to delay in its approval by the Iranian Parliament was postponed by
one year.
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number of accounting identities. With a few exceptions these relations are estimated by
the least squares methods over the period 1974-1993, and are documented in PBO (1993).11
This model is composed of a production and factor demand module, a Keynesian income-
expenditure ow module, with investment expenditures disaggregated by 10 major produc-
tion sectors, and an aggregate price equation. The second model developed seems to represent
an extension of the rst.
In addition to these models used for Irans development plans, a number of other macro-
econometric models have been developed for Iran since the contribution of Habib-Agahi in
the beginning of the 1970s, both at the PBO and by other researchers around the world.
Prominent examples of the latter category are the models developed by Baharie (1973), Vakil
(1973), Shahshahani-Madani (1978), Heiat (1986) and Safai (1986). These models di¤er in
the extent of detail and the level of disaggregation, but are very similar in their underlying
structures. They are largely demand-determined Keynesian models, and with a few minor
exceptions neglect the e¤ect of relative prices and stock-ow relations on the economys
evolution. Also, very little is known about their short run forecasting performance, or their
long-term properties. In contrast to these papers, Noferesti and Arabmazar (1993) develop
a model in which aggregate supply is not assumed to be perfectly elastic, while Valadkhani
(1997), building on the work of the above-mentioned papers, develops a more comprehensive
macroeconometric model for Iran.
There are also a number of simple planning/optimal control models developed notably
by Motaman (1979), Razavi (1982), and Razavi (1983) for the analysis of the optimal rate of
oil production in oil-based economies. These models are primarily concerned with the inter-
temporal optimization problem involved in oil production decisions (namely, whether to
produce now or later), and are typically very simple as far as their main structural relations
are concerned. They are not intended as forecasting or budgetary tools and, in view of
the current constraints on Irans capacity to produce oil, have limited relevance to Irans
economic policy problems.
An alternative strategy to the models developed in the above mentioned papers would be
to estimate vector autoregressive (VAR) models in some of the main macroeconomic vari-
ables, such as output, price level, money supply, oil exports, consumption, and investment,
along the lines originally developed by Sims (1980). In more recent papers, Mehrara and
Oskoui (2007) make use of a structural VAR to determine whether oil price shocks are the
main source of output uctuation for Iran, while Elyasiani and Zhao (2008) make use of
vector autoregression, generalized impulse response function and generalized variance de-
composition techniques to determine the interdependencies of Iran with its major trading
partners and the US. But the use of VAR models, without imposition of structural relations
on their long run solutions, will be limited to short-term forecasting and are unlikely to be
relevant for medium term policy analysis. Thus, a long run structural approach to VAR
modeling and its application to the Iranian economy, which we take up in this paper, are
worth pursuing.
Other papers of interest dealing with economic growth in Iran are those of Valadkhani
(2006), which looks at the determinants of the growing unemployment rate in Iran, Pahla-
vani, Wilson, and Worthington (2005), which tries to identify the short and long run deter-
11The relations in the published version of model PBO1 were mainly estimated over the period 1974-1992.
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minants of growth, taking into account the endogenously identied structural breaks in Iran,
and Becker (1999), which looks at the development of several variables from pre- to post-
revolution and the e¤ect of monetary shocks on these variables. Bahmani-Oskooee (1995)
and Kia (2006) explore the determinants of ination in Iran, taking into account the role
external factors.
While all the papers discussed so far have made use of annual data, there are a few
IMF working papers on Iran using quarterly data. In particular, Bonato (2008) looks at
the determinants of ination in Iran, Celasun and Goswami (2002) develop an econometric
model of short run ination and long run money demand dynamics in Iran, and Liu and
Adedeji (2000) construct a model to develop the determinants of ination in Iran. However,
all of the papers using quarterly data focus on a certain aspect of the Iranian economy, for
instance the money demand relation or the determination of ination, and as such do not
consider the interconnection of the domestic variables with that of foreign variables. Neither
do they explore the short run and the long run channels of growth. Part of our contribution
has then been to make use of quarterly data, while exploring the interconnection between
the Iranian economy and the rest of the world and paying attention to both the short and
long run channels through which oil export revenues e¤ect growth.
Appendix B: Sources and Construction of the Data
Domestic and Foreign Data Series
Our data set contains quarterly observations on Iran and another 33 countries, from the
rst quarter of 1979 to the fourth quarter of 2006. The domestic variables included are
(log) real output, yt, (log) real money supply, mpt, (log) price level, pt, the rate of ination,
t = pt   pt 1, and (log) nominal exchange rate, et. Specically
yt = ln(GDPt=CPIt), mpt = log(Mt=CPIt),
et = ln(Et), pt = ln(CPIt), (32)
where GDPt is the nominal Gross Domestic Product, Mt is a broad liquidity measure that
includes M1 and Quasi Money, CPIt is the consumer price index, and Et is the number of
rials per one US dollar exchanged on freemarkets.
The two exogenous variables in the model are foreign output, yt , and oil income in US
dollars dened as xot = ln(P ot X
o
t ), where P
o
t is the nominal price of oil per barrel in US
dollars, and Xot is the domestic oil export in thousands of barrels per day. Foreign output
was computed as the trade weighted average of log real output indices (yjt) of Irans trading
partners:
yt =
33X
j=1
!j;t 1yjt; time varying weights,
yt;FW =
33X
j=1
!j;2001 03yjt; xed weights,
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where !j;2001 03 and !j;t 1 are dened below by (33) and (34). The countries included
in these weighted averages are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
China, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United
States.
The trade weights are computed based on the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics between
1980 and 2006. The bilateral trade of Iran with country j during a given year t, denoted
by Tjt, is calculated as the average of exports and imports of Iran with that country. Trade
data for Belgium is only available from 1997, and so the trade shares for Belgium between
1980 and 1996 was calculated by using the data on Belgium-Luxembourg and multiplying
it by 0.93 (this procedure was also adopted in Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007)).
In addition, trade data between South Africa and partner countries are only available from
1998, and so the data of all trading partners with South Africa was used to construct the
South African trade shares with partners between 1980 and 1997.
The xed trade weights were computed over the period 2001-2003 and are given by
!j;2001 03 =
Tj;2001 + Tj;2002 + Tj;2003
T2001 + T2002 + T2003
; (33)
where Tt =
PN
j=1 Tjt, for t = 2001; 2002; 2003: The time varying trade weights are computed
as
!jt =
Tj;t + Tj;t 1 + Tj;t 2
Tt + Tt 1 + Tt 2
(34)
We also considered three year moving averages of the the annual trade shares, !jt = Tjt=Tt
and obtained very similar results.
The most important trading partner for Iran is Japan, which accounts for between 15 and
20 percent of the total Iranian trade. More than 40 percent of the Iranian trade originates
in or is destined for the euro area economies with Germany, Italy and France being Irans
most important trading partners in Europe.12 Trade with China has increased signicantly
over the past two decades, emphasising the shift in the Iranian trade from the west to the
east. Other countries in our data set with whom Irans total trade is more than ve percent
are UK, Korea, and Turkey.
Data Sources: Domestic Variables
Real Output
The main source of data on Irans real output is the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic
of Iran (CBI) online database: Economic Time Series Database (http://tsd.cbi.ir/). Quar-
terly observations are available from 1988Q2 while annual data is available from 1959. We
seasonally adjust the quarterly data using the U.S. Census Bureaus X-12 ARIMA seasonal
12When computing the trade weights and thus the foreign variables we aggregate Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain as the euro countries and so use their combined trade
weight and output.
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adjustment program.13 Quarterly series were interpolated (backwards) linearly from the an-
nual series using the same method as that applied by Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith
(2007) to data for a number of the 33 countries in their data set. This data source is also
updated to end of 2006 and used for the computation of the foreign output variable described
above. For a description of the interpolation procedure see Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and
Smith (2007) Section 1.1 of Supplement A.
Consumer Price Indices
The CBI online database contains annual CPI data from 1959Q2 and quarterly data from
1990Q2. To complete the quarterly data series we make use of several volumes of the CBIs
Economic Report and Balance Sheets. We rst use the 1981, 1987, and the 1989 Economic
Report and Balance Sheets to compute quarterly data between 1976 and 1989 from the
monthly data available in these reports. We then obtain quarterly CPI series by splicing
the three series of CPI such that our quarterly CPI data stretches from 1976Q2 to 2007Q1,
setting the average value of the index for 2000 equal to 100. Finally, we seasonally adjust the
quarterly data using the U.S. Census Bureaus X-12 ARIMA seasonal adjustment program.
Exchange Rates
We obtain the o¢ cial exchange rate series from the CBI online database. This data is
available from 1959Q2. The nominal marketor freeexchange rate series used is from the
IMF INS database and is available from 1979Q1.
Money and Quasi Money
The data on money and quasi money supply are from the IMF IFS series 34 and 35 and are
available from 1957Q1. As money supply data between 1984Q2 and 1986Q2 is missing in
the IFS series, we obtained the complete series by splicing the IFS and CBI data on money
supply. Quasi money data was missing for 1960Q4, 1978Q4, and between 1985Q2 to 1986Q2.
Again we lled in for the missing data by splicing the IFS and the CBI data, but as CBI
data was only available from 1974Q1, the complete series for quasi money is available only
from 1961Q1.
We seasonally adjust the quarterly data on money and quasi money supply using the
U.S. Census Bureaus X-12 ARIMA seasonal adjustment program.
Oil Exports and Prices
Annual and quarterly oil export (thousand barrels per day) are available, from 1973 and
1978Q2 respectively, from the CBI online database. Quarterly crude oil production is also
available from the CBI online database.
Value added of oil group, Gross Domestic Product at Basic Prices, and Non-Oil Gross Do-
mestic Product at Basic Prices are available annually from 1959 and quarterly from 1988Q2.
13For further information see U.S. Census Bureau (2007): X-12-ARIMA Reference Manual at
http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/
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We rst seasonally adjust the quarterly data and then obtain quarterly series from 1959Q2
by linearly interpolating (backwards) the missingquarterly series from the annual series
Population
The annual data on population was obtained from the IMF IFS series 99. This data was
available from 1948. As quarterly data on population were not available, quarterly series
were interpolated linearly from the annual series using the same method used to generate
quarterly output series described above.
Conversion from Iranian to Gregorian Years
The Iranian year generally starts on the 21st of March, as such the Iranian quarter 1 contains
10 days of the Gregorian quarter 1 and 80 days of Gregorian quarter 2. To convert the data
from Iranian to Gregorian calendar we simply adopt the following rule: G(Q) = 8
9
Iran(Q 
1) + 1
9
Iran(Q), where G(Q) is the Gregorian quarter Q and Iran(Q) is the Iranian quarter
Q. More complex ways of calculating, such as taking into account exact number of days in
the Iranian Quarter and converting the data was also investigated, but there were essentially
no di¤erences in the series.
Appendix C: Unit Root Test Results
To make sure that we make sensible interpretation of the long run relations and also to ensure
that we do not work with a mixture of I(1) and I(2) variables we need to consider the unit
root properties of the core variables in our model (yt;mpt; t; ept; yt ; xot). Table 5 reports the
standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. But as the power of unit root tests are often
low we also report the generalized least squares version of the Dickey-Fuller test (ADF-GLS)
proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) and the weighted symmetric ADF test
(ADF-WS) of Park and Fuller (1995), as they both have been shown to have better power
properties than the ADF test.
It is clear from Figures 2 to 6 that most of the core variables are trended and so we will
include a trend and an intercept in the ADF regression for all the variables but ept and xot,
while we will only include an intercept in the ADF regressions applied to their di¤erences
and second di¤erences. As can be seen from Table 5 both ADF and ADF-WS provides
strong support that yt, mpt, t, ept, yt , xot are all I(1), as the unit root hypothesis is clearly
rejected when applied to the rst di¤erences of these variables while this is not the case for
the unit root test applied to the levels. The ADF-GLS on the other hand gives less clear cut
results but generally supports the rejection of unit roots in the rst di¤erence of the core
variables. Thus we can safely regard all the core variables as being I(1) and not worry about
dealing with a mixture of I(1) and I(2) variables in our model.
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Table 5: Unit root test statistics (based on AIC order selection)
Unit root test statistics for the levels
yt pt et ept mpt y

t xot CV CV T
ADF -2.67 -2.01 -0.79 -1.43 -0.19 -1.80 -2.50 -2.89 -3.45
ADF-GLS -1.29 -2.01 -1.08 -1.37 -0.68 -2.02 -1.10 -2.14 -3.03
ADF-WS -1.48 -2.06 -1.02 -1.72 -0.59 -2.12 -3.09 -2.55 -3.24
Unit root test statistics for the rst di¤erences
yt pt et ept mpt y

t xot CV CV T
ADF -8.42 -3.82 -10.35 -10.45 -4.31 -3.37 -8.36 -2.89 -3.45
ADF-GLS -7.66 -2.96 -9.79 -10.29 -2.94 -1.94 -1.09 -2.14 -3.03
ADF-WS -8.16 -4.04 -10.63 -10.73 -4.29 -3.64 -6.08 -2.55 -3.24
Unit root test statistics for the second di¤erences
2yt 
2pt 
2et 
2ept 
2mpt 
2yt 
2xot CV CV T
ADF -9.07 -5.95 -7.78 -7.55 -6.90 -8.79 -10.12 -2.89 -3.45
ADF-GLS -3.72 -5.43 -7.82 -7.55 -2.10 -1.50 -0.28 -2.14 -3.03
ADF-WS -9.38 -5.84 -8.08 -7.82 -6.77 -8.69 -6.33 -2.55 -3.24
Notes: ADF denotes the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test, ADF-GLS the generalized least squares
version of the ADF test, and ADF-WS the weighted least squares ADF test. The sample period
runs from 1979Q1 to 2006Q4. CV T gives the 95 percent simulated critical values for the test with
intercept and trend, while C is the 95 percent simulated critical values for the test including an
intercept only.
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